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Abstract
We propose a test of whether self-reported network data is best seen as an actual link
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nd that bilateral link formation ts the data
better than unilateral link formation, but the data are best interpreted as willingness to link
rather than an actual link. We then expand the model to include self-censoring and nd it
to t the data signicantly better than willingness to link. This suggests that, in our data,
the data generating process behind self-reported links is a hybrid between an actual link and
willingness to link.
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1. Introduction
It is increasingly recognized that many important economic phenomena, such as trade, informa-
tion di¤usion, and learning, take place within social networks (e.g. Granovetter 1985, Jackson
2008) and that the architecture of these networks can a¤ect the e¢ ciency and equity of the re-
sulting allocation (Vega-Redondo 2006). We also now know that the mechanism through which
links are created has a profound inuence on the equilibrium architecture of purposely formed
networks. In particular, Bala and Goyal (2000) have shown that unilateral and bilateral link
formation result in fundamentally di¤erent network structures  see also Goyal (2007). The
consent rule (unilateral versus bilateral) within a group may also shape the aggregate outcome,
as Charness and Jackson (2007) have shown in an experimental set-up.
Bilateral link formation refers to situations in which the consent of both nodes is needed
for a link to be formed; it is a natural assumption for voluntary exchange. Unilateral link
formation arises whenever one node can form a link without the express consent of the other; it
is a natural assumption for information access networks, e.g., the Internet. It may also arise in
market exchange when legal or social norms make it unlawful for one party to refuse to trade.1
The contribution of this paper is primarily methodological. The econometric analysis of
social networks is still novel, and there often is a lack of clarity on the implicit assumptions
necessary to estimate network models. The ultimate aim of this paper is to shed some light on
the way self-reported network data should be interpreted, and how discordant responses should
be treated. We nd that in our case some models t the data better than others. Other data
may yield di¤erent conclusions.
We propose a simple methodology for testing whether self-reported network data reect a
1 In many developed countries anti-discrimination laws typically make it unlawful for a retailer to refuse to sell
to a specic customer.
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simple willingness to link or an existing link and, in the latter case, whether this link is gen-
erated by an unilateral or bilateral link formation process. Building on the work of Comola
(2007), we take pairwise stability as starting point for the estimation process. First introduced
by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), pairwise stability has established itself as a cornerstone equi-
librium condition in the study of bilateral link formation processes (Goyal 2007). Using pairwise
stability as starting point, Comola (2007) uses a bivariate probit model to estimate a bilateral
link formation model. We extend this approach by noting that, under unilateral link formation,
the absence of a link is formally equivalent to a pairwise stable decision by both nodes not to
form a link.
We illustrate our methodology using data on self-reported mutual insurance links. This is a
natural choice given that many empirical studies of social networks have relied on self-reported
data and that mutual insurance networks have received much attention in the literature (e.g.
Scott 1976, Altonji, Hayashi and Kotliko¤ 1992, Coate and Ravallion 1993, Townsend 1994,
Fafchamps and Lund 2003). Every household in an African village was asked to give a list of
households on whom they rely or who rely on them  for help in cash, kind or labor. The
question is intended to capture a link between two households i and j and should in principle
be answered in the same way by both, irrespective of whether the assistance is one-sided or
reciprocated. In practice, it is frequent that household i mentions j but j does not mention i.
This is open to multiple interpretations. One possibility is that respondents gave the names
of households from whom they wish to seek assistance, not necessarily those who would provide
it, should the need arise. In this case, answers are best understood as representing willingness
to link, not an actual link. Another interpretation is that respondents provided information on
actual links but their answers di¤er because of misreporting. It is unclear a priori which of these
two alternatives is a better representation of the data.
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To test between the two, we use the fact that actual links should satisfy equilibrium condi-
tions; willingness to link need not. Two types of equilibrium conditions are considered, depending
on whether link formation is bilateral or unilateral. It seem natural to expect mutual insurance
links to require the agreement of both parties and this is indeed how the economic literature
has modeled informal risk sharing (e.g. Coate and Ravallion 1993, Kocherlakota 1996). In this
case, link formation is bilateral and pairwise stability is a necessary condition for the network
to be in equilibrium.2
It is also conceivable that social norms make it impossible for villagers to refuse assisting
others. For instance, a son may not be able to refuse helping his father. Platteau (1996) argues
that many agrarian societies, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, cultivate egalitarian norms, a
point that has repeatedly been made by anthropologists and by casual observers alike.3 In the
presence of sharing norms, the link formation process is basically unilateral. In this case, a
transformed version of the pairwise stability condition must hold in the sense that both nodes
must agree not to form a link.
Comola (2007) has shown that, under the normality assumption, the restrictions imposed
by pairwise stability take the form of a bilateral probit model with partial observability (Poirier
1980). In contrast, if answers only represent willingness to link, the relevant regression model
is a simple probit. Building on this insight, we test whether willingness to link, bilateral, or
unilateral link formation is most consistent with the responses given by surveyed households.
This is achieved using the non-nested likelihood ratio test rst proposed by Vuong (1989), that
we adapt to correct for network dependence across residuals. When we peg the bilateral and
unilateral models against each other, we nd that the bilateral link formation model wins.
2Pairwise stability does not fully characterise equilibrium in the village network; it is a local condition. One
could therefore argue that our test is not e¢ cient since it fails to impose all the structure of a village network
equilibrium. The di¢ culty is that deriving global equilibria would require additional assumptions about the
information each household has about all payo¤s, etc, something we are reluctant to do.
3Barr and Stein (2008) provide some recent evidence to this e¤ect.
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However, both are outperformed by a simple willingness-to-link model.
We then relax the willingness-to-link model to allow for self-censoring. For instance, a
respondent i may refrain from reporting his wish to seek help from j if he anticipates rejection.
Alternatively, i may report links with individuals who he cannot refuse to help even though he
prefers not to. Both cases involve self-censoring of willingness to link in the rst case, and of
unwillingness to link in the second. We show that self-censoring can be represented as a bilateral
probit model without cross-equation coe¢ cient restrictions.
We nd evidence of self-censoring in our data. This is important because self-censoring of
reported willingness to link has long plagued the study of link formation (e.g. Hitsch, Hortacsu
and Ariely 2005, Belot and Francesconi n.d., Fisman, Iyengar, Kamenica and Simonson 2008).
In their study of internet dating, Hitsch et al. (2005) for instance note that the emails partic-
ipants send to each other to initiate interaction may not reect their true willingness to link
if they refrain from making openings they know will be rejected. Belot and Francesconi (n.d.)
make similar observations in their study of internet dating. Self-censoring is also present in
matching processes in which participants can only list a limited number of preferred links 
e.g., the University Centralised Application System (UCAS) in the UK: students can only list
5 universities of their choice, and hence do not list universities most likely to reject them. The
methodology proposed here o¤ers a way of testing the presence of self-censoring.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide a conceptual framework and
describe our estimating and testing strategy. The data are described in Section 3. Estimation
results are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
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2. Conceptual framework and testing strategy
In this section we begin by presenting the di¤erent estimation strategies used in the paper. As
in Comola (2007) the starting point of our estimation strategy is pairwise stability as dened by
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). We then discuss the important issue of how to draw consistent
inference by correcting standard errors for non-independent data. We conclude the section with
a discussion of non-nested hypothesis testing with non-independent data.
Formally, for each pair of nodes (dyad) ij, dene giij = 1 if i reported a link with j,
and 0 otherwise. Similarly dene gjji = 1 if j reported a link with i. Variables g
i
ij and g
j
ji
provide a representation of the data. Their interpretation varies depending on what the data
generation process is assumed to be. In subsection (2.1) we consider these data as an indication
of willingness to link and we specify the corresponding data generation process. In subsections
(2.2) and (2.3) we regard giij and g
j
ji as two di¤erent measurements of the same actual link gij .
Subsection (2.2) species the data generation process if the link formation process is bilateral
while subsection (2.3) focuses on the unilateral case.
2.1. Willingness to link
Here the response variables giij and g
j
ji are interpreted as the willingness of nodes i and j respec-
tively to form the link gij . Formally, let the network be denoted by the symmetric adjacency
matrix g = [ gij ] with gij = 1 if the link ij exists and gij = 0 otherwise. Given the wording of
the survey question, we cannot distinguish between help that is mutual and one-sided assistance
that is given or received by the respondent. We therefore dene a link gij to exist whenever i and
j help each other, whether help is one-sided or mutual. It follows that gij = gji by construction.
The utility that node i derives from network g is written Ui(g). By a standard abuse of
notation, let g ij denote the network g without the link gij , that is, with gij = 0. Similarly,
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let g+ij denote the network with the link gij , that is, with gij = 1. The gain to household i
of forming the link gij is Ui(g+ij)   Ui(g ij). We assume that this gain is a linear function of
observables Xij and a zero-mean residual "ij :
Ui(g+ij)  Ui(g ij) = X 0ij   "ij (2.1)
Uj(g+ji)  Uj(g ji) = X 0ji   "ji (2.2)
This the key maintained assumption on which the testing strategy rests.
Since the order in which i and j appear in the data is arbitrary, they must be interchangeable.
This implies that the coe¢ cient vector  must be the same in equations (2.1) and (2.2). Assuming
that ("ij ; "ji) are jointly normal, it follows that equations (2.1) and (2.2) can be estimated as a
standard probit by stacking observations giij and g
j
ji:
Pr(giij = 1) = Pr (Ui(g+ij)  Ui(g ij)) = Pr
 
"ij  X 0ij

Pr(gjji = 1) = Pr (Uj(g+ji)  Uj(g ji)) = Pr
 
"ji  X 0ji

(2.3)
2.2. Bilateral link formation
Let us now interpret giij and g
j
ji as two separate measurements of the same actual link gij . This
implies that discrepancies in survey answers giij and g
j
ji must be due to misreporting. Since we
have no reason to believe one answer more than the other, we give each measurements equal
weight.
In order to specify the data generation process, we impose the partial equilibrium structure
implied by pairwise stability. We rst consider the bilateral link formation case. As in Comola
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(2007) the starting point of our estimation strategy is pairwise stability as dened by Jackson
and Wolinsky (1996). Pairwise stability imposes that the agreement of both nodes is needed for
a link to be formed, and all protable nodes are formed in equilibrium. This occurs if and only
if:
8gij = 1, Ui(g+ij)  Ui(g ij) and Uj(g+ij)  Uj(g ij)
8gij = 0, if Ui(g ij) < Ui(g+ij) then Uj(g ij) > Uj(g+ij)
This set of conditions implies that:
Pr(gij = 1) = Pr (Ui(g+ij)  Ui(g ij) and Uj(g+ij)  Uj(g ij)) (2.4)
Using (2.1) and (2.2) equation (2.4) is equivalent to:
Pr(gij = 1) = Pr
 
"ij  X 0ij and "ji  X 0ji

(2.5)
where ("ij ; "ji) are jointly normal.
Model (2.5) has a single dependent variable but two regressing equations. Such model, rst
proposed by Poirier (1980) and later on used by Comola (2007) to model network formation, is
known as a partial observability bivariate probit. This is because the link gij can be understood
as the product of two distinct and unobservable events, is willingness to form the link ij and js
willingness to form the same link. Let us dene these unobservable variables wiij and w
j
ji such
that wiij = 1 if "ij  X 0ij and similarly for wjji. Under pairwise stability, a link is formed only
if both i and j are willing to form it, i.e., gij = 1 i¤ wiij = 1 and w
j
ji = 1 or, more succinctly,
i¤ wiijw
j
ji = 1. The term partial observabilitycomes from the fact that we only observe the
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product wiijw
j
ji, not each of them separately. That is, whenever a link gij = 0 we can not observe
whether one or both nodes are not willing to form it.
In practice, we have two measurements giij and g
j
ji of gij . The estimated model is thus:
Pr(giij = 1) = Pr
 
"ij  X 0ij and "ji  X 0ji

Pr(gjji = 1) = Pr
 
"ji  X 0ji and "ij  X 0ij

(2.6)
Estimating  under the assumption of bilateral link formation thus boils down to maximizing
the likelihood function implicitly dened by (2.6).
2.3. Unilateral link formation
An undirected network may also result from a process of unilateral link formation. This cor-
responds to the situation in which only one sides consent is su¢ cient for a link to be formed.
Put di¤erently, a link does not exist only if both nodes refuse to create it (Goyal 2007). As in
the bilateral case, we let wiij and w
j
ji represent the nodesunobserved willingness to form link
gij . Under unilateral link formation, gij = 1 whenever either of the two nodes wishes to form
a link. It follows that gij = 0 only when both links do not wish to form the link. This simple
observation forms the basis of our estimation strategy because it implies that, using a change
of variable, the unilateral link formation model can also be estimated as a partial observability
model.
To see how this is possible, we begin by noting that:
Pr(gij = 0) = Pr (Ui(g+ij) < Ui(g ij) and Uj(g+ij) < Uj(g ij)) (2.7)
= Pr
 
"ij > X
0
ij and "ji > X
0
ji

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Let hij  1  gij . We have hij = 1 i¤ wiij = 0 and wjji = 0 or, more succinctly, i¤ (1  wiij)(1 
wjji) = 1. Estimation can proceed by applying a partial observability bivariate probit to the
transformed system:
Pr(hij = 1) = Pr
  "ij   X 0ij and   "ji   X 0ji (2.8)
The dependent variable is still binary, and the partial observability feature ensures that the
absence of a link (hij = 1) is interpreted as implying that both nodes do not wish to form that
link. As is clear from (2.8), estimated coe¢ cients have the reverse sign compared to (2.5). This
is because we are estimating individualswillingness not to form a link.
Once again, we have two measurements hiij and h
j
ji of hij . The estimated model is thus:
Pr(hiij = 1) = Pr
  "ij   X 0ij and   "ji   X 0ji
Pr(hjji = 1) = Pr
  "ji   X 0ji and   "ij   X 0ij (2.9)
Estimating  under the assumption of unilateral link formation thus boils down to maximizing
the likelihood function implicitly dened by (2.9).
2.4. Standard errors
Dyadic data can seldom if ever be regarded as made of independent observations; residuals are
typically correlated across some observations. This does not invalidate estimation itself: as long
as regressors remain uncorrelated with residuals, coe¢ cients can be estimated consistently. But
uncorrected standard errors are inconsistent, invalidating inference.
Methods have been proposed to correct standard errors in non-independent data. These
methods extend Whites formula for robust standard errors to correlation across observations
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(Conley 1999). For dyadic data, the most pressing concern is the correlation in the residual for
observation gij with those pertaining to all observations involving nodes i and j. This is because
is decision to form a link with j potentially a¤ects his or her decision to form a link with any
other node. Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) propose a correction of standard errors that takes
care of this form of cross-observation dependence of the form:
AV ar(b) = 1
N  K (X
0X) 1
0@ NX
i=1
NX
j=1
NX
k=1
NX
l=1
mijkl
2N
Xijuiju
0
klXkl
1A (X 0X) 1 (2.10)
where  denotes the vector of coe¢ cients, N is the number of dyadic observations, K is the
number of regressors, X is the matrix of all regressors, Xij is the vector of regressors for dyadic
observation ij, and mijkl = 1 if i = k; j = l; i = l or j = k, and 0 otherwise. Formula (2.10)
was developed for linear regressions where uij denotes the residual from observation ij. To
apply it to maximum likelihood estimation, simply replace uij by the corresponding score lij .
The only structure imposed on the covariance structure is that E[uij ; uik] 6= 0, E[uij ; ukj ] 6= 0;
E[uij ; ujk] 6= 0 and E[uij ; uki] 6= 0 for all k but that E[uij ; ukm] = 0 otherwise. The standard
errors reported in this paper are all based on formula (2.10).
It is conceivable that E[uij ; ukm] 6= 0 for i 6= k;m and j 6= k;m. This would arise, for
instance, if is willingness to form a link with j depends on whether k has a link with m. In
this case, formula (2.10) is no longer su¢ cient to correct standard errors and more cross-terms
should be added. Whether this is feasible depends on the data. If the researcher has observations
from unlinked sub-populations (e.g., multiple villages), it is possible to allow for arbitrary cross-
observation dependence by clustering standard errors at the level of each sub-population (e.g.
Arcand and Fafchamps 2008, Barr, Dekker and Fafchamps 2008). In our data, we only have a
single village so this option is not available. Bester, Conley and Hansen (2008) has suggested
an approach to approximately eliminate bias in standard errors by dividing the data into large
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blocks and clustering within blocks. Unfortunately this approach requires a large sample, which
again is not our case.
2.5. Non-nested tests
Our aim is to test which one of models (2.3), (2.6) or (2.9) best accounts for the data. To
this e¤ect we proceed by pairwise comparisons. Vuong (1989) has proposed a framework for
hypothesis testing in non-nested models. Say we want to test which of two alternative, non-
nested models k and m t the data best. Let M = N(N   1) be the total number of dyadic
observations. The original form of the Vuong test statistic is
V =
M 1=2LR(k;m)
!^
d! N(0; 1)
where LR (k;m)  Lk   Lm is the log of the likelihood ratio statistic and:
!^2 =
1
M
MX
ij=1
"
log
lkij
lmij
#2
 
24 1
M
MX
ij=1
log
lkij
lmij
352
where lkij and l
m
ij are the observation-specic scores for each model k and m. This test can be
implemented more simply by regressing the di¤erence between scores on a constant:4
lkij   lmij = km + vkmij
The t-value on the constant km is the Vuong statistic that tests whether model k outperforms
model m. For inference to be valid, we correct the standard error of the constant bkm for
cross-dependence across observations using formula (2.10).
4The Vuong test requires that the models have the same dependent variable. This condition is satised by
construction for models (2.3) and (2.6). In spite of the change of variable from giij to h
i
ij = 1   giij , it is also
satised for model (2.9) because the scores are the same except for a sign change, which we correct for.
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Essential for our identication strategy is that both nodes have provided a separate state-
ment giij and g
j
ji regarding their mutual link gij . When testing unilateral versus bilateral link
formation, identication is achieved from the symmetry between giij and g
j
ji. In the bilateral
case, it is unlikely to observe a link when one of the nodes strongly wishes not to link. In the
unilateral case, it is unlikely not to observe a link when one of the nodes strongly wishes to link.
It is this di¤erence between the two models that makes identication possible in test of bilateral
versus unilateral link formation.
When we test either of the link formation models (2.6) or (2.9) against the willingness to link
model (2.3), identication is achieved from the implicit symmetry assumption that, if responses
giij and g
j
ji are two measurements of the same actual link gij , then both nodes i and j should
be equally likely to report it. In contrast, if responses correspond to willingness to link, there
may be systematic di¤erences between the responses made by i and j. Systematic di¤erence in
responses would arise, for instance, if some features (e.g., popularity) make some nodes more
attractive to others. If, for instance, j is more popular than i, then i may be willing to link with
j while the reverse is not true. In this case, i would be reporting a willingness to link with j
while j does not report a willingness to link with i. But if giij and g
j
ji correspond to statements
about an actual link, then j would report a link with i even if j is not keen on the link but
cannot refuse it.
In the last section of the paper, we abandon this symmetry assumption and introduce a
hybrid model that shares features from both (2.3) and (2.6) or (2.9). The same methodology
is then used to test this hybrid model against (2.3), (2.6), or (2.9). In this case, identication is
achieved from the fact that (2.3), (2.6), and (2.9) are more restricted than the hybrid model. If
the restriction is binding, then the hybrid model should dominate; if the restriction is not binding,
then the hybrid model should not be able to t the data better than the more restricted model.
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3. The data
To illustrate our estimation and testing strategy we use survey data from a village community
named Nyakatoke in the Buboka Rural District of Tanzania, at the west of Lake Victoria.
The village is mainly dependent on farming of bananas, sweet potatoes and cassava for food,
while co¤ee is the main cash crop. The community is composed by 600 inhabitants, 307 of
which are adults, for a total of 119 households interviewed in ve regular intervals during 2000.
This dataset is ideal for our purpose because it is a census covering all 119 households in the
village.5 The data include information on householdsdemographics (composition, age, religion,
education), wealth and assets (land and livestock ownership, quality of housing and durable
goods), income sources and income shocks, transfers and network relations.
Each adult respondent was asked: Can you give a list of people from inside or outside of
Nyakatoke, who you can personally rely on for help and/or that can rely on you for help in
cash, kind or labor?". Aggregated at the level of each household, the responses to this question
constitute variables giij and g
j
ji. In other words, g
i
ij = 1 if an adult member of household i
mentions an adult member of household j in their response to the above question. Nyakatoke
data have been analyzed by De Weerdt and Dercon (2006) and De Weerdt and Fafchamps (2007).
These authors have shown that reported mutual insurance links giij and g
j
ji are strong predictors
of subsequent loans and gifts, and that linked households give and receive much more from each
other in times of illness.
Given the cultural context, it is not obvious how to interpret Nyakatoke villagersresponses
to the risk sharing link question. One possible interpretation is that responses represent the
respondents desire to establish a link. This interpretation is particularly appealing when the
responses are discordant, that is, when giij 6= gjji. It is nevertheless possible that discordant
5Everyone in the village agreed to participate in the survey, but there are some missing data for 4 households.
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responses as due to measurement error and that the data describe, albeit with some error,
actual links between villagers.6
The process by which links between villagers are formed can be bilateral or unilateral. Much
of the economic literature on informal risk sharing in developing countries has assumed that
households willingly enter in such arrangements (e.g. Kimball 1988, Coate and Ravallion 1993).
Applied to social networks, this approach implicitly assumes that mutual insurance links follow
a bilateral process. In contrast, much of the anthropological literature has emphasized the
di¢ culty for individuals to abstract themselves from the moral and social obligation to assist
others in need (e.g. Scott 1976, Platteau 1996). This point has been made by a number of
economists as well, notably those studying remittance ows (e.g. Lucas and Stark 1985, Azam
and Gubert 2006). Anderson and Baland (2002) provide evidence that individuals living in
Kenyan slums put money in rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) to avoid claims
on their resources by spouse and relatives. Ambec (1998) and Banerjee and Mullainathan (2007)
take these observations as starting point to model the saving behavior of poor households. This
line of reasoning implies an unilateral mechanism of link formation. Testing these alternative
data generation processes is the objective of this paper.
Because our dataset is small, we are limited in the number of regressors we can credibly
include in the analysis. The covariates that appear in the regressions should be seen as illustrative
of the type of variables one may want to include in an analysis of this kind. What matters most
for our purpose is whether conclusions regarding bilateral or unilateral link formation are robust
6 Independently of whether the underlying network follows a bilateral or unilateral link formation process, it is
necessary to decide how to treat discordant responses in the estimation itself. If respondents forget to mention
some of their risk-sharing partners because they are involved in too many links to recall them all, we should
treat any discordant pair as an existing link, i.e, as gij = 1. Doing so implicitly assumes that the main form of
measurement error is omission, i.e., that respondents do not mention someone as a risk sharing partner unless
the expectation of reciprocity is strong. Alternatively, discordant responses may arise because one of the two
respondents mistakenly reported a link where none exists, i.e., discordant cases correspond to gij = 0. Without
information on individual intent, we cannot disentangle the two.
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to alternative choices of regressors. If we include too few regressors, the alternative models we
wish to test will not account for much of the variation in the data, and we will not be able to
tell them apart. Ultimately, all we want is a list of regressors that enables us to robustly test
the models against each other. Since we are not interested in ascribing a causal interpretation
to any of the regressors, all regressors should be viewed as controls proxying for their own e¤ect
plus any other correlated e¤ect.
In this section we present our preferred list of regressors. At the end of the paper we discuss
whether our results vary with alternative regressors. The covariates Xij used in the regression
analysis fall into three categories: variables that reect the attractiveness of the potential partner
j; variables proxying for homophyly, that is, the desire to link with similar households; and
variables controlling for is need to link.
Two regressors capture attractiveness. The rst one, Oij , is the overlap in productive activ-
ities between i and j. It is calculated as:
Oij =
7X
a=1
LaiLaj
where Lai is the share of total time spent by adult members of household i in activity a.7 Each
Lai is constructed using information collected on time use in seven broad income generating
categories. Households whose productive activities overlap are expected to have more correlated
incomes. Since less correlated incomes generate more opportunities for risk pooling, households
with less overlap in activities with household i are in principle more attractive risk sharing
7 In the survey each adult individual mentions the productive activities he or she is involved into. These activ-
ities are divided in seven categories: casual labor, trade, crops, livestock rearing, assets, processing of agricultural
products, and other o¤-farm work. Individuals can report multiple activities but are not asked about the relative
importance of each activity. We have therefore no alternative but to assign equal weight to all listed activities.
Lai is calculated as follows. Say household i has n members, m of which report working full time in a and k report
a and one other activity. Then Lai = 1n (m +
k
2
). Individuals who do not report any involvement in an income
generating activity are omitted from the calculation. Five households in the sample report no active member.
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partners (. Fafchamps and Gubert 2007, De Weerdt and Fafchamps 2007) We therefore expect
Oij to have a negative sign.
We also control for the in-degree P ij of j, omitting any link between i and j to avoid spurious
correlation. We think of P ij as a proxy for various unobservable characteristics e.g., sociability,
generosity, moral sense that make j an attractive partner for many villagers. It is reasonable
to assume that, other things being equal, all households in our sample would prefer to be linked
to popular households. Of course, popular households may not wish to link to everyone, since
this would mean assisting the entire village.8 They may therefore be unwilling to link with
unpopular households, a feature that is captured by pairwise stability and the bilateral link
formation model.
A second set of regressors seeks to control for homophyly, that is, the desire to link with
similar or proximate households. The literature has shown that social ties depend to a large
extent on social and geographical proximity (e.g. Fafchamps and Gubert 2007, De Weerdt and
Fafchamps 2007). To control for geographical proximity, we introduce a dummy that takes value
one if i and j are neighbors, that is, live less than 100 meters apart.9 Blood ties are controlled
for using a kinship dummy that takes value one if i and j or members of their household 
are related.10 Constructing this variable is particularly demanding in terms of data collection,
a strong point of the Nyakatoke dataset. We also include a religion dummy taking the value of
one if i and j have the same religion.11
To capture similarity in social status, we include as regressor the absolute di¤erence in total
8For a formalization of this idea, see for instance Vandenbossche and Demuynck (2009) s model of risk sharing
network formation. See Ellsworth (1989) for a detailed description of mutual assistance ows in a Burkinabe
village, and of the role played by one holy manas center of a village-wide redistribution network. There is no
such central person in our village, however.
9Slight variation in the cuto¤ distance does not a¤ect our main results.
10This includes parents/children, siblings, cousins, uncle/aunt/niece/nephew, grand-parents/grand-children,
and other blood ties.
11Catholic, or Protestant, or Muslim 41%, 39% and 20% of the village population respectively.
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wealth (computed as the sum of land and livestock) jwj   wij between i and j.12 If i prefers to
link with someone of similar wealth, the coe¢ cient of jwj   wij should be negative. To avoid
spurious results, we borrow from Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) and include the sum of wealth
(wi + wj) to control for the possibility that wealthier individuals have, on average, more links.
The third set of regressors includes factors likely to make household i more interested in
forming links. Some respondents report more links than others. This may be because they
are pro-social or anti-social. To control for is proclivity for forming or reporting mutual
insurance links with others, we include is out-degree as regressor, omitting any link with j.
Wealthy households are less in need of mutual insurance. To capture this possibility, we include
a dummy which is equal to one if household i in top 25% wealth percentile in the village. For
similar reasons, we also include the number of adult members of household i. As De Weerdt
and Fafchamps (2007) show, informal transfers in Nyakatoke respond to health shocks. Since
they pool labor resources, larger households should nd it easier to deal with health shocks than
smaller ones and hence are less in need of forming mutual insurance links with other villagers
(Binswanger and McIntire 1987).
Descriptive statistics are reported Table 1. The rst and second panels of the table present
dichotomous and continuous variables, respectively. In the dataset there are 119 households,
which make 119*118=14042 dyads in total. We see from the table that the proportion of pairs
for which giij or g
j
ji = 1 is 7%. The proportion of discordant responses is large. Around one
third of household pairs share the same religion. Wealth and the other continuous regressors
display a healthy amount of variation in the data. Some regressors were rescaled to facilitate
estimation.13
12Data on land was collected in acres, but transformed in monetary equivalent using a conversion rate of 300000
tzs for 1 acre. This reects the average local price in 2000, the time at which the data were collected.
13To minimize convergence problems that arise when using bivariate probit with partial observability.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics (n=14042)
giij ; g
j
ij g
i
ij = g
j
ij = 1 280
giij 6= gjij 700
giij = g
j
ij = 0 13062
Neighbors distance ij <100 m 4%
Same family ij have blood ties 6%
Same religion ij same religion 35%
Rich respondent i in top 25th % 25%
continuous variables mean min max sd
Overlap in productive activities Oi 0.22 0 1 0.162
In-degree of household j (/10) (**) 0.52 0 2.30 0.445
jwj   wij() 0.44 0 2.80 0.524
wi + w
()
j 0.91 0 5.56 0.678
Out-degree of household i (/10) (**) 0.52 0 1.90 0.304
No. adult members in household i (/10) 0.26 0.1 0.90 0.131
(*) 1 unit corresponds to 1 million Tanzanian Shillings.
(**) excluding the ij link
4. Empirical results
4.1. Model estimation
We now estimate models (2.3), (2.6) and (2.9). Each model includes the list of Xij regressors
presented in Table 1. For each set of results the z-values reported in the last column are based
on dyadic standard errors corrected using formula (2.10).
We begin by reporting the estimation results obtained when we assume that responses to the
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risk sharing question capture willingness to link, as explained in subsection (2.1). Coe¢ cients
estimates are reported in Table 2 using probit. They suggest that respondents prefer to link
with popular households who live nearby, are related, and share a similar level of wealth. The
coe¢ cient of wi + wj is positive and marginally signicant, suggesting that willingness to link
is higher among wealthy households. Other regressors are not signicant.
Table 2: Willingness to link
Regressor coe¢ cient dyadic z
Overlap in activities Oij -0.194 -0.85
Popularity P ij 0.508 7.71***
Neighbor dummy 0.760 5.17***
Blood ties dummy 0.987 5.86***
Same religion dummy 0.169 1.31
jwj   wij -0.250 -2.35**
wi + wj 0.249 1.74*
Out-degree of i 0.287 1.65*
Rich dummy of i -0.004 -0.04
Nber adult members of i 0.105 0.26
Intercept -2.659 -15.99***
We then turn to the bilateral link formation model (2.6).14 Results are presented in Table
3. Several coe¢ cient estimates are similar to those reported in Table 2. Popularity P ij remains
strongly signicant. Coe¢ cient estimates are again suggestive of homophyly. Overlap in activi-
14We also estimated the model with alternative assumptions about misreporting, e.g., assuming that discordant
pairs are due to over-reporting only (i.e., gij = giijg
j
ji) or under-reporting only (i.e., gij = 1 whenever g
i
ij or
gjji = 1). These versions yield parameter estimates that are by and large comparable to those reported in Table
3. But the Vuong test cannot be used to compare these alternative versions to the willingness to link model (2.3)
because they use di¤erent dependent variables.
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ties Oij is now marginally signicant with the anticipated sign, suggesting a desire to link with
individuals who have a di¤erent income prole.
Table 3: Bilateral link formation
Regressor coe¢ cient dyadic z
Overlap in activities Oij -0.065 -1.92*
Popularity P ij 0.136 2.52**
Neighbor dummy 0.213 3.20***
Blood ties dummy 0.316 3.95***
Same religion dummy 0.042 1.95*
jwj   wij -0.057 -1.81*
wi + wj 0.051 1.33
Out-degree of i 0.037 1.05
Rich dummy of i 0.021 0.71
Nber adult members of i 0.213 2.30**
Intercept -0.271 -1.74*
arc tan() -1.894 -3.59***
Next we present the results assuming that the data were generated by the unilateral link
formation model (2.9). As explained in subsection (2.3), we transform household responses giij
and gjij into the equation-level dependent variables h
i
ij  1  giij and hjij  1  gjij . Results are
reported in Table 4. To facilitate comparison with Table 3, we report estimated coe¢ cients b di-
rectly, which means inverting the sign of the coe¢ cient estimates obtained from estimating (2.9)
with partial observability bivariate probit. In terms of coe¢ cient estimates, results are similar
to those reported in Table 3. Popularity P ij and activity overlap Oij are both signicant with
the anticipated sign. Homophyly variables are all strongly signicant while is characteristics
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are not.
Table 4: Unilateral link formation
Regressor coe¢ cient dyadic z
Overlap in activities Oij -0.213 -2.04**
Popularity P ij 0.412 7.83***
Neighbor dummy 0.706 9.88***
Blood ties dummy 0.928 9.54***
Same religion dummy 0.155 2.83***
jwj   wij -0.198 -3.69***
wi + wj 0.171 1.80*
Out-degree of i 0.161 0.97
Rich dummy of i 0.107 1.17
Nber adult members of i 0.564 1.50
Intercept -2.862 24.64***
arc tan() 0.628 3.47***
4.2. Specication tests
We now turn to the main object of the paper, which is to compare the performance of the
di¤erent models in accounting for the data. As explained in Section 2, we proceed by pairwise
comparisons, adapting the non-nested Vuong test to the dyadic structure of the data. To compare
two models k and m we calculate, for each observation ij, the log-likelihood contributions (or
score) under the two models and we regress the di¤erence lkij   lmij on a constant, correcting the
standard errors using formula (2.10). The t-value of the constant is the Vuong test corrected
for dyadic non-independence. Since the distribution of the Vuong test is asymptotically normal,
the relevant critical value for a 5% level of signicance is 1:96. Note that the test works in two
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directions: if t > 1:96 model k is to be preferred to model m; if t <  1:96 model m is to be
preferred to model k. For values of t between  1:96 and 1:96 the test is inconclusive both
models t the data equally.
Table 5 reports the result of the pairwise comparisons between the willingness-to-link model
and the other two. When the bilateral and unilateral models are compared to each other, the
bilateral model is found superior. But the Table unambiguously shows that the willingness-to-
link model ts the data best.
Table 5: Vuong tests
Model k Model m Vuong test Best t
bilateral unilateral 2.28** bilateral
willingness to link bilateral 2.34** willingness to link
willingness to link unilateral 3.34*** willingness to link
4.3. Self-censoring
Our results imply that responses given to the mutual insurance question are best understood as
indicative of willingness to link than evidence of an actual link. Yet De Weerdt and Fafchamps
(2007) have shown that giij is a strong predictor of gifts and transfers reported in subsequent
survey rounds. Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) report similar ndings with data collected in the
Philippines using a similarly worded question.15 Responses to the mutual insurance question
may be more than just willingness to link.
In particular, we suspect that respondents did not report households with whom they would
like to share risk but who are likely to turn them down. Self-censoring has been discussed
in the economic literature on dating. In that literature, the researcher typically has access to
information on willingness to date  e.g., answers to a direct question following speed dating
15 In fact the Philippines question was used as template for the Tanzania survey.
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interviews (e.g. Belot and Francesconi n.d., Fisman et al. 2008), or emails sent to prospective
partners on an internet dating site (Hitsch et al. 2005). In both cases, the authors worry that
respondents may fail to list or contact desirable partners who are unlikely to accept them.16
A similar kind of self-censoring may also be at work in our data. In particular, household i
may have liked to share risk with household j but expected j to refuse, and so failed to mention
j as possible mutual insurance link. This corresponds to an alternative data generating process
in which j can veto a link that i wants.
Such data generating process can be represented as follows. As before, giij is is report of
whether a link to j exists. This report is now thought of as made of two parts: (1) is willingness
to link with j, which we denote wij ; and (2) is expectation of whether the link would be accepted
by j, which we denote eij . Expectation eij is thought of as made of two intermingled parts: js
willingness to link with i and js inability to refuse a link with i even though j does not want to
link with i. We observe giij = 1 if both wij = 1 and eij = 1. We observe g
i
ij = 0 if either wij = 0
or eij = 0 or both.
To illustrate what we have in mind, imagine that unpopular households wish to link to pop-
ular households (wij = 1) but popular households never wish to link with unpopular households
(wji = 0). Yet popular households cannot refuse to help some of the unpopular ones, e.g.,
members of their church. In that case, unpopular household i will report giij = 1 with popular
household j whenever i expects that j will not refuse to help (eij = 1) because of social norms
or altruism. Formally we have:
Pr(giij = 1) = Pr(wij = 1 and eij = 1) (4.1)
16Self-censoring has also been discussed in the context of matching models in which individuals can only rank
a subset of their possible choices (e.g., schools or jobs). In such models, it is optimal for low ranked individuals
not to wastelimited slots on options they are unlikely to get.
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with
Pr(wij = 1) = xij
Pr(eij = 1) = xji
Model (4.1) can be estimated using bivariate probit with partial observability. The only
di¤erence with model (2.5) is that we no longer impose that coe¢ cients be the same in the two
equations. Instead, we now estimate di¤erent coe¢ cients  and  for the two equations. As
before, the estimator allows for non-independence between Pr(wij = 1) and Pr(eij = 1) (for
instance because of unobserved individual e¤ects common to both). Model (4.1), which we call
the vetoed linkmodel, can be seen as a rened version of willingness to link which incorporates
expectations about the potential partners likely behavior.
Estimation results for the vetoed link model are presented in Table 6. Coe¢ cient estimates
for the wij equation have the same interpretation as before. Coe¢ cient estimates for the eij
equation capture two kinds of e¤ects: js willingness to link with i, and js capacity to veto a
link with i. Bilateral link formation model (2.6) is a restricted form of (4.1) with  = , which
is equivalent to assuming that is statement about the existence of a link with j only depends
on js willingness to link. Put di¤erently, in model (2.6), is statement regarding a link with j
internalizes both is and js willingness to link. The symmetry of (2.6) is equivalent to setting
 =  and implies that giij and g
j
ji have the same probability, i.e., both i and j are equally
likely to report link gij . Model (4.1) allows giij and g
j
ji to have di¤ering probabilities depending
on the characteristics of i and j. The willingness to link model (2.3) corresponds to the case
where  = 0: is answer only depends on is desire to link with j. Model (4.1) sits between both
extremes in that it allows giij and g
j
ji to have di¤ering probabilities in a way that nevertheless
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takes into account more than just own willingness to link. In model (4.1), if  < 0 for a given
regressor xji, this implies that xji is associated with a lower eij and thus a higher likelihood of
vetoby j. A  > 0 in contrast implies that the corresponding xji makes it harder for j to
refuse to assist i.
We see that estimated coe¢ cients in the wij equation are somewhat similar in terms of
magnitude and statistical signicance to those reported in earlier regressions: popularity P iij is
again strongly signicant, and so are geographical proximity and a shared religion. The out-
degree of i (omitting the ij link) is also statistically signicant. In contrast, coe¢ cients in the
eij regression are quite di¤erent from those reported for the wij equation. Only three coe¢ cients
are statistically signicant: the kinship dummy, js out-degree, and the size of js household.
This means that kin are less likely to veto a link but the smaller js household is and the larger
js out-degree, the more likely j will veto a link with i. This suggests that larger households
have a duty to care for others, possibly because their size makes them better able to self-insure
and thus to assist others.
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Table 6. Vetoed links model
wij equation eji equation
Regressor coe¢ cient dyadic z Regressor coe¢ cient dyadic z
Overlap in activities Oij 0.281 1.50 Overlap in activities Oij -2.389 -1.23
Popularity P ij 0.462 7.32*** Popularity P
j
i -0.034 -0.16
Neighbor dummyij 0.643 7.34*** Neighbor dummyij 0.454 0.29
Blood ties dummyij 0.963 5.73*** Blood ties dummyij -0.306 -0.42
Same religion dummyij 0.205 2.97*** Same religion dummyij -0.308 -1.26
jwj   wij -3.233 -1.06 jwj   wij 7.914 0.36
wi + wj 0.271 1.09 wi + wj -0.513 -0.60
Out-degree of i 0.259 3.59*** Out-degree of j -0.845 -1.99**
Rich dummy of i 0.003 0.03 Rich dummy of j 0.103 0.52
Nber adult members of i 0.148 0.88 Nber adult members of j 4.672 2.25**
Intercept -2.597 -12.85*** Intercept 2.700 2.54**
arc tan() -1.999 -4.00***
By analogy with Section 2, it is also possible to dene the dualanalogue of the vetoed link
model. In this model, i reports his unwillingness to link with j, except in cases when j can
impose a link with i. This implies that i reports giij = 1 whenever i expects j to impose a link
on i, even if i is not keen to link with j. In this model, we have:
Pr(giij = 0) = Pr(wij = 0 and eij = 0)
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with
Pr(wij = 0) =  xij
Pr(eij = 0) =  xji
This model is the generalized equivalent of the unilateral link formation with hij = 1  gij .
It can be estimated in a fashion similar to (4.1), but the interpretation is slightly di¤erent. Here
i reports a missing link (giij = 0) if i does not want to link and i expects that j cannot impose
a link on i. But i reports a link whenever either i wishes to link with j or i expects that j can
impose a link. We call this model the forced linkmodel since j can force a link that i does not
want.
Regression estimates are shown in Table 7. As we did for Table 4, we report estimated
coe¢ cients b and b directly, i.e., we invert their sign to facilitate comparison with Table 6.
Interpretation of the coe¢ cients of the wij equation is as before. In the case of the eij equation,
 =  means that i expect j to force a link with i based purely on his/her willingness to link with
i. This would arise for instance if i fully internalizes the unilateral link formation equilibrium.
In contrast, if all  = 0, giij is consistent with pure willingness to link. A  > 0 means that the
xji variable raises the likelihood that, in is opinion, js can force a link on i.
Coe¢ cient estimates for the wij equation are fairly similar to those reported earlier in Table
2, except that wi + wj is not marginally signicant anymore and is out-degree and is rich
dummy are now statistically signicant. Coe¢ cient estimates for the eij equation are di¤erent
in sign and magnitude from those of the wij equation, a result that is consistent with our earlier
nding that giij is not consistent with a unilateral link formation process. Several regressors have
a signicant coe¢ cients in the eij equation, indicating factors that make it more (or less) likely
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that j be willing and able to force a link onto i. Geographical proximity and blood ties appear
with a strongly signicant positive coe¢ cient, indicating that it is di¢ cult to deny assistance to
kin and neighbors. The negative coe¢ cient for is popularity P ji indicates that the more popular
i is, the less likely it is that j can impose a link onto i.
Table 7. Forced links model
wij equation eji equation
Regressor coe¢ cient dyadic z Regressor coe¢ cient dyadic z
Overlap in activities Oij -0.162 -0.62 Overlap in activities Oij -0.326 -0.98
Popularity P ij 0.707 7.31*** Popularity P
j
i -0.496 -2.13**
Neighbor dummyij 0.436 2.07** Neighbor dummyij 1.023 8.11***
Blood ties dummyij 0.788 4.86*** Blood ties dummyij 1.218 7.82***
Same religion dummyij 0.131 1.20 Same religion dummyij 0.219 1.47
jwj   wij -1.776 -1.85* jwj   wij -5.052 -3.25***
wi + wj 0.172 1.48 wi + wj 0.130 0.72
Out-degree of i 0.534 4.15*** Out-degree of j -0.509 -1.81*
Rich dummy of i 0.168 2.05** Rich dummy of j 0.277 1.91*
Nber adult members of i 0.270 0.97 Nber adult members of j 0.925 2.75***
Intercept -3.112 -10.82*** Intercept -2.247 -10.12***
arc tan() 1.081 1.29
While these results are interesting in their own right, our primary interest is to test whether
either of these models ts the giij data better than the pure willingness to link model. The
Vuong test for the vetoed link and forced link models are presented in Table 8. Results show
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that both signicantly dominate the willingness to link model.17 This is consistent with the
idea that reported links giij are best interpreted as self-censored willingness to link. The last
row of the Table also shows that we cannot distinguish between the vetoed link and forced link
model: although the vetoed link provides a slightly better t, the di¤erence is not statistically
signicant. This is not entirely surprising given that the two models are fairly similar in terms
of the underlying data generation process.
Table 8: Vuong test vetoed links and forced links
model k model m Vuong test best t
vetoed links willingness to link 3.47*** vetoed links
vetoed links bilateral 3.58*** vetoed links
vetoed links unilateral 4.05*** vetoed links
forced links willingness to link 2.65** forced links
forced links bilateral 3.27*** forced links
forced links unilateral 3.94*** forced links
vetoed links forced links 0.70 both
5. Robustness analysis
To ascertain whether our ndings are sensitive to the choice of regressors, we reestimate all
models using di¤erent sets of explanatory variables. Results, not shown here to save space,
indicate that when the included regressors have little predictive power e.g., when the number
of regressors is small the comparison between models tends to be less conclusive. This is hardly
17For comparison purposes, we also computed a standard likelihood ratio test to compare the vetoed link and
bilateral link formation models since the latter is nested in/is a restricted form of the former. The value of the test
is 87, which is well above the 1% critical value of 20.1 for a 2 distribution with 8 degrees of freedom. This conrms
that the vetoed link regression dominates the bilateral link formation model. A similar comparison between the
forced link and the unilateral link formation model yields a test statistic of 124, which clearly shows that the
forced link model dominates. Neither of these test statistics corrects for dyadic correlation across observations,
however.
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surprising as the problem is common to all non-nested tests. The models are compared in terms
of their ability to account for the data. When regressors have little predictive power, all models
do rather poorly in predicting observed giij and hence cannot be distinguished.
In most cases, eliminating one or more regressors leaves the modelsranking unchanged but
turns some pairwise comparison inconclusive. Dropping some regressors can nevertheless change
the modelsranking. In particular, if we drop the in-degree P ij of j and/or the out-degree of i,
non-nested comparisons indicate that willingness to link ranks lower than bilateral or unilateral
link formation. Both self-censored models continue to dominate, however.
Finally, it worth mentioning that we have encountered the convergence di¢ culties that partial
observability models are known for. Using a stepping algorithms for non-concave regions of the
likelihood function alleviates part of the problem, but occasionally convergence may not be
achieved. Also, in our experience the partial observability bivariate probit model is particularly
sensitive to the choice of ad-hoc initial values and to multicollinearity, which in some extreme
cases may result in the impossibility of computing standard errors.
6. Conclusion
The theoretical literature on networks has shown that the nature of the link formation process 
e.g., whether unilateral or bilateral has a strong e¤ect on the resulting network architecture. In
this paper we develop a methodology to test whether network data reect a simple willingness to
link or an existing link and, in the latter case, whether this link is generated by an unilateral or
bilateral link formation process. Taking the equilibrium concept of pairwise stability as starting
point, we propose a methodology to compare bilateral and unilateral processes. Central to this
methodology is the observation that unilateral link formation requires that both nodes wish
not to form a link for the link not to exist. This formal similarity between the bilateral and
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unilateral link formation processes allows us to model them both as partial observability models
and to compare them with the appropriate non-nested likelihood test.
We illustrate this methodology with data on informal risk-sharing networks in a Tanzanian
village. The data is particularly well suited for our purpose because it covers all households in
the community, and because the respondents are asked to enumerate all their network partners.
The information provided by respondents is nevertheless open to several interpretations.
One possible interpretation is that responses capture an actual link. This interpretation is
consistent with the observation made by De Weerdt and Fafchamps (2007) and Fafchamps and
Lund (2003) who have shown that risk sharing links reported by survey respondents strongly
predict subsequent inter-household transfers. It however remains unclear what process generates
these links. The development literature is uncertain as to whether risk sharing networks should
be seen as entirely voluntary, or whether social norms impose an element of moral or social
pressure making it di¢ cult for households to refuse helping others. If risk sharing is voluntary,
link formation can be modelled as bilateral; if risk sharing is imposed by social norms, unilateral
link formation is a more appropriate representation of the data generating process. Using a
Vuong non-nested test, we nd that the bilateral link formation model ts the data better than
a unilateral one.
Another possible interpretation is that responses to a question about mutual insurance links
capture the respondents willingness to link, not an actual link. This may explain the large
proportion of discordant answers whereby i reports a link with j although j does not report a
link with i. We test a willingness-to-link model against the bilateral and unilateral link formation
models and nd that willingness to link ts the data best. This nding, however, is reversed if
we drop the in-degree of j or the out-degree of i as regressors.
We then expand the data generating process to allow for self-censoring by respondents. We
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investigate two forms of self-censoring. In the rst one, which we call the vetoed link model, we
allow respondents to form expectations about the other partys ability to refuse a link. In the
second, which we call the forced link model, respondents anticipate that they may be unable
to refuse certain links. We nd that both models dominate the other three models, suggesting
that self-censoring is present. But we are unable to distinguish between the vetoed and forced
link models both t the data equally well.
While promising, the approach presented here su¤ers from a number of shortcomings. Test
results are ultimately predicated on the assumption that the regressors used in the estimation are
reasonable predictors of willingness to link. In the case of the self-censoring models, identication
rests on exclusion restrictions that cannot be tested without additional data. The contribution
of this paper should therefore be seen as primarily methodological. Stronger inference could be
achieved if, in addition to information about links, the survey contained more direct evidence
on respondentswillingness to link (or de-link) with other households. Should such data become
available together with objective information on social links, the methodology presented here
can yield a stronger test of bilateral versus unilateral link formation.
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